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Abstract
Artificial Intelligence began as a field probing some of the most fundamental
questions of science - the nature of intelligence and the design of intelligent
artifacts. But it has grown into a discipline that is deeply entwined with
commerce and society. Today’s AI technology, such as expert systems and
intelligent assistants, pose some difficult questions of risk, trust and account-
ability. In this paper, we present these concerns, examining them in the
context of historical developments that have shaped the nature and direction
of AI research. We also suggest the exploration and further development of
two paradigms, human intelligence-machine cooperation, and a sociological
view of intelligence, which might help address some of these concerns.
1 Introduction
“Synthesis defines an ambitious put-a-man- on-the-moon goal. By
doing so, it forces scientists and engineers to cross uncharted ter-
rain in pursuit of the goal. This requires the solution of unscripted
problems that are not normally encountered through either obser-
vation or analysis... synthesis drives the evolution of paradigms”1
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is the field of computer science which aims to
create, or synthesize, intelligence. The pursuit of creating intelligent machines
has contributed not only to psychology, cognitive science, neurology and
philosophy, but has also given birth to whole new branches of research.
The field of AI research was formally founded at a conference on the
campus of Dartmouth College in the summer of 1956.2 It has come a long way
since then, having gone through many cycles of boom and bust,“AI winters”
and summers.3 Now AI applications have left the annals of Department of
Defense R&D, and trickled down to everyday use. They can be found in
common place consumer items and inexpensive intelligent toys, even though
very often consumers fail to recognize the technology source. For example,
the Kinect, which provides a 3D bodymotion interface for the Xbox 360, uses
algorithms that emerged from lengthy AI research.4
The adoption and integration of AI based technology in all spheres has
followed a pattern reminiscent of many modern technologies, including, for
example, the internet, digital computing,5 and mobile telephony. The pace
1It is hard to understate the role of synthesis in science and technological development.
The above quote has been taken from the context of synthetic biology, see Steven A Benner
and A Michael Sismour. “Synthetic biology”. In: Nature Reviews Genetics 6.7 (2005),
pp. 533–543.
2The conference was chaired by J.McCarthy, M. Minsky, N. Rochester and C.Shannon.
For a full report, see John McCarthy et al. “A proposal for the dartmouth summer research
project on artificial intelligence, august 31, 1955”. In: AI Magazine 27.4 (2006), p. 12.
3Nils J Nilsson. The quest for artificial intelligence. Cambridge University Press Cam-
bridge, 2010.
4Jan Smisek, Michal Jancosek, and Tomas Pajdla. “3D with Kinect”. In: Consumer
Depth Cameras for Computer Vision. Springer, 2013, pp. 3–25; Kourosh Khoshelham and
Sander Oude Elberink. “Accuracy and resolution of kinect depth data for indoor mapping
applications”. In: Sensors 12.2 (2012), pp. 1437–1454; Iason Oikonomidis, Nikolaos Kyr-
iazis, and Antonis A Argyros. “Efficient model-based 3D tracking of hand articulations
using Kinect.” In: BMVC. 2011, pp. 1–11.
5The reader is referred to James Cortada’s essay in Technology and Culture’s April
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has been such that historians and sociologists have barely had an opportu-
nity to study its arrival, use and implications for society. Most discussions
in this direction have been based on a priori and futuristic assessments, dis-
cussing the future of AI technology and what it might eventually turn out like.
For instance, researchers have raised concerns about AI machines becoming
malicious (unfriendly), apathetic or uncontrollable, often evoking images of
killer robots and future wars between man and machine.6 The importance
of incorporating ‘friendliness’ in AI research is repeatedly stressed in these
discussions. Some have focussed on the concept of ‘intelligence explosion’,
forewarning a future event where radically self-improving machines reach a
state where it is impossible to predict or comprehend their actions.7 Others
have noted that increasing dependence on decision-making intelligent ma-
chines may itself lead to a world where it is impossible for humans to survive
without them, leaving machines effectively in control.8
Such discussions, though very important in their own right, tend to take
the attention away from issues of risk and trust posed by AI-based technology
which has already diffused in the society. In this essay, we argue that current
AI technology (e.g., expert systems and intelligent assistants) is based on a
notion of intelligence which is somewhat different from the notion of‘general
intelligence’ in popular perception. The intelligence or expertise of these
2013 issue. James W Cortada. “How New Technologies Spread: Lessons from Computing
Technologies”. In: Technology and Culture 54.2 (2013), pp. 229–261.
6Bill Joy. “Why the future doesn’t need us.” In: Nanoethics–the ethical and social
implicatons of nanotechnology (2000), pp. 17–39; Nick Bostrom, Milan M Cirkovic, and
Martin J Rees. Global catastrophic risks. Oxford University Press Oxford, 2008; Eliezer
Yudkowsky. “Artificial intelligence as a positive and negative factor in global risk”. In:
Global catastrophic risks 1 (2008), p. 303; Nick Bostrom. “Existential risks”. In: Journal
of Evolution and Technology 9 (2002); Nick Bostrom. Ethical issues in advanced artificial
intelligence. 2003.
7Luke Muehlhauser and Anna Salamon. “Intelligence explosion: Evidence and import”.
In: Singularity Hypotheses. Springer, 2012, pp. 15–42.
8In his now famous article “Why The Future Doesn’t Need Us”, computer scientist Bill
Joy quotes Ted Kaczynski, “As society and the problems that face it become more and
more complex and machines become more and more intelligent, people will let machines
make more of their decisions for them, simply because machine-made decisions will bring
better results than man-made ones. Eventually a stage may be reached at which the
decisions necessary to keep the system running will be so complex that human beings will
be incapable of making them intelligently.’ See Joy, op. cit.; Theodore Kaczynski et al.
The unabomber manifesto: Industrial society and its future. Filiquarian Publishing, LLC.,
2005.
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machines is measured through their performance in certain specialized con-
texts, and little else. Further, this confusion of what AI technology is based
on, and how it works, itself has risk and trust-related consequences. As AI
researcher Elizier Yudkowsky had noted, “By far the greatest danger with
Artifical Intelligence is that people conclude too early that they understand
it”.9
We start off this essay by tracing the history of current AI research in
Section 2. Various factors which have steered AI research in a particular
direction, and diminished in others, have been outlined. Section 3 examines
the nature of AI systems today, illustrating, through the examples of expert
systems and intelligent assistants, the questions of risk and trust they pose
to society. In Section 4, we suggest two paradigms, which might complement
basic research in AI to address some of these concerns . The discussion is
summarised in the conclusion.
2 Historical Developments
Ever since AIs inception, there has been no clear consensus on what consti-
tutes ‘intelligence’. The subject has drawn from a broad array of disciplines
- Philosophy, Logic, Biology, Psychology, Statistics and Engineering. In the
absence of an agreed-on curriculum for training students in AI,10 new re-
searchers who enter the field bring with them different standards, traditions
and problems. As a result, one big challenge that AI has faced is that the
research effort has been characterized by a multiplicity of approaches, each
endeavoring to attain some specific objective . This multigoal character of
AI research has crystallized into its theoretical pluralism, and its institution-
alization by means of competing groups with different aims11. It has been
a major factor in the eventual branching of Artificial Intelligence to various
subfields, e.g., Knowledge Representation, Machine Learning and Natural
Language Processing.
Up until the early 1970s, AI researchers dealt with highly theoretical
problems probing the nature of intelligence, and the researchers pursued
9Yudkowsky, op. cit.
10Nilsson, op. cit.
11Ronald David Schwartz. “Artificial intelligence as a sociological phenomenon”. In:
Canadian Journal of Sociology/Cahiers canadiens de sociologie (1989), pp. 179–202, Fleck,
1982: 172 in.
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projects that were staged in highly controlled laboratory settings.12 The heavy
initial funding (by DARPA) into such pathbreaking research was fuelled partly
due to the cold war,13 and partly due to the highly optimistic claims made
by its pioneers and their early theoretical successes.
However, such theoretical approaches to AI gradually came to be thought
off by many computer scientists as fringe activities that did not adhere to
rigorous scientific standards - some even viewed AI as ‘a field that housed
charlatans’.14 Niel Nilsson, one of the founding fathers of the discipline, recalls
that when he first interviewed for a position at SRI in 1961,15 a researcher
had warned him against joining research on neural networks because it was
‘premature’, and his involvement with it could damage his reputation. This
concern for ‘respectability’ had a stultifying effect on many AI researchers.16
In 1969, the Mansfield Amendment dealt another significant blow to the
field. The Amendment put DARPA under increasing pressure to fund only
‘mission-oriented direct research, rather than basic undirected research’.17
The creative, freewheeling exploration that was characteristic of the early
pioneering work in AI gradually came to be viewed as a burden. Instead,
the money was directed at specific projects with clear objectives, such as
autonomous tanks and battle management systems.18 Not only did this greatly
influence the direction of research, but also, perhaps more importantly, swayed
the spirit that guided work in the field. This has been noted by Marvin
Minsky,19 co-founder of MIT’s AI Lab and a leading cognitive scientist:
12Nilsson, op. cit., p 265.
13Blay Whitby. Reflections on Artifical Intelligence. Intellect (UK), 1996, p. 66.
14Nilsson, op. cit., p 339.
15Stanford Research Institute
16It is interesting to note that many researchers in AI today deliberately call their
work by other names, such as informatics, knowledge-based systems, cognitive systems
or computational intelligence. One of the reasons is that these names help to procure
funding. As New York Times(John Markoff. “Behind Artificial Intelligence, a Squadron of
Bright Real People”. In: New York Times 14 [2005]) reported in 2005, “Computer scientists
and software engineers avoided the term artificial intelligence for fear of being viewed as
wild-eyed dreamers”
17National Research Council (US). Committee on Innovations in Computing, Communi-
cations, and Lessons from History. Funding a revolution: government support for computing
research. National Academies Press, 1999, under ”Shift to Applied Research Increases In-
vestment” (only the sections before 1980 apply to the current discussion).
18Ibid., under “Shift to Applied Research Increases Investment”.
19Wade Roush. “Marvin minsky on common sense and computers that emote”. In:
Technology Review, July 13 (2006).
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“In the early days, DARPA supported people rather than pro-
posals. There was a lot of progress from starting in 1963 for about
ten years in all branches and all approaches aimed to modeling
intelligence. But the Mansfield Agreement made it much harder
to support visionary researchers. At the same time, the American
corporate research community started to disappear in the early
1970s. Bell Labs and RCA and the others essentially disappeared
from this sort of activity.”
Also, by the end this period, the power of AI methods had already in-
creased to the point where realistic applications seemed within reach.20 This
gave rise to what Minsky calls ‘the entrepreneur bug’.21 He attributes the
disappearance of young scientists in that period to an increased tendency to
patent things, start start-ups and make new products. Support for original
theoretical research in areas like commonsense reasoning eventually fizzled
out.
The collective consequence of all these factors was that by the end of
the 70s many had people diverted to highly specialized subfields that solved
specific real-world problems. These problems ranged from Speech Recognition
and Understanding Systems, Consulting Systems, Understanding Queries and
Signals to Computer Vision.22 Since these also had commercial applications,
funding and notions of academic respectability became directly associated
with these specialized problems.
Most AI researchers around this period eventually adopted the premise
that general human-like intelligence can be developed by combining the pro-
grams that solve various subproblems using an integrated agent architecture.
This was the Intelligent Agent paradigm, an approach that had become widely
accepted in the AI community by the end of the 90s.23
An intelligent agent is a system that perceives its environment and takes
actions which maximize its chances of success.24 The simplest intelligent
20Nilsson, op. cit., p 265.
21Roush, op. cit.
22Nilsson, loc. cit.
23David Poole, Alan Mackworth, and Randy Goebel. Computational Intelligence. Oxford
University Press Oxford, 1998, pp. 27, 3258, 968972; George F Luger. Artificial intelligence:
Structures and strategies for complex problem solving. Pearson education, 2005, pp. 721;
Stuart Russell. Artificial intelligence: A modern approach, 2/E. Pearson Education India,
2003, pp. 235240.
24The definition used here is due to Russell and Norvig, see idem, Artificial intelligence: A
5
agents are programs that solve specific problems. The paradigm gave re-
searchers license to study isolated problems and find solutions with actual
applications, without agreeing on one single approach.25 For perhaps the first
time in AI, a partial consensus on a notion of intelligence was achieved, since
it was well aligned with the pluralistic character of AI, the constraints of
funding, the notion of academic respectability, as well as relevant to industrial
applications. Many fundamental questions related to intelligence - symbolic
and commonsense reasoning, intuition, imagination, creativity, and emotional
intelligence, were left answered and unexplored.
3 AI Today
“Today’s AI is about new ways of connecting people to computers,
people to knowledge, people to the physical world, and people to
people”. - Patrick Winston, MIT AI Lab briefing, 1997
3.1 All That Glitters
Today, with the increased power of relatively inexpensive computers, avail-
ability of large databases and growth of the World Wide Web, AI technology
like expert systems and intelligent assistants have slowly diffused into our
society. These have been said to heralding a new age and revolutionizing the
way we live today. Such proclamations might be true, but not necessarily
in the context in which they are made. Most people overlook the fact that
most of these systems do not work on the premise of approximating human
cognitive abilities, but on performing certain tasks in highly specialized sce-
narios. They do well in performing certain jobs that are complicated for
people to do, but they are far from being capable of carrying out tasks that
are simple for humans to do. Many elements, like common-sense reasoning,
ethical judgements and decision-making under uncertainties, which might be
core components of intelligence, are missing. The deployment of such systems
modern approach, 2/E , Other definitions also include knowledge and learning as additional
criteria.
25An agent that solves a specific problem can use any approach that works some agents
are symbolic and logical, some are sub-symbolic neural networks and others may use new
approaches.
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and their celebration, besides diverting research from other fields, has social,
ethical and risk - related consequences.
Performance in specialized contexts (e.g., processing natural language,
playing chess, recognizing patterns) are the sole basis for intelligence for cur-
rent AI based systems. There is a certain gap in what these systems are
represented as doing, and what they actually do. This can mislead people
on two levels. One, that they create a notion that they work in the same
way that humans do is (human-experts in the case of expert systems and
assistants in case of digital assistants). On a second level, they create the
impression that these are free from prejudices, personal bias and errors that
might affect a human counterpart. The actual implementation and mecha-
nism - what goes behind an AI technology - is entirely invisible to the user.
The knowledge engineering, as it is called in the case of expert systems, and
the underlying architecture, might involve restrictions and selective represen-
tation of data, and unavoidable biases resulting from the organization of data
and architecture of the machine.
3.2 Risk
Another, possibly graver issue is that of handling of uncertainties by AI sys-
tems. Inductive knowledge of computer systems is inadequate. The number
of combinations of possible inputs and internal states of a computer system
of any complexity is huge, and especially in AI technologies, such complexity
is intractable. Even with highly automated testing, it will seldom be feasible
to exercise each and every state of a system to check for errors or underlying
design faults, or bugs that may have caused them. As computer scientist Eds-
ger Djikstra famously put it in 1969, “Program Testing can be used to show
the presence of bugs, but never to show their absence!” Because bugs may
lurk for years before becoming manifest as a system failure, no guarantees
can be offered.
In the case of expert systems, although they do reason usefully and eco-
nomically about specific problems in medicine, geology, chemistry and other
delimited areas, they are acknowledged to be brittle (that is, they break
down) when confronted with problems outside their area of expertise or even
on problems within their area of expertise, if knowledge were needed that
had not been provided in their rulebooks. They dont know what they dont
know, and therefore might provide wrong answers in cases where a human
expert would do better.
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A colorful anecdote involving John McCarthy26 illustrates this. In an
interaction with the medical expert system MYCIN, he typed in some in-
formation about a hypothetical patient, saying that he was male and also
saying that he underwent amniocentesis. MYCIN accepted all that without
complaint! That male patients dont get pregnant was not considered part of
the ‘expert knowledge’ that MYCIN needed to be given.27
Donald Mitchie, a British researcher, examines this problem through his
concept of the ‘human window’ on the reasoning of the program, where its
behaviour is ‘scrutable’. Outside of this window, Mitchie observes, it is
impossible to tell whether the program is being exceedingly clever or is just
malfunctioning.28
Reliance on experts is said to be an inevitable aspect of high modernity.29
As we enter an age of knowledge-intensive ‘information society’, how we
employ expert systems based on AI will turn out to be crucial in shaping our
society.
The handicaps involving AI technology, as well as their associated risks,
are greatly amplified in those systems that are critical to human safety or
security. A disturbing example of this is provided by Donald MacKenzie,30 a
Professor of Sociology at the University of Edinburgh:
“On October 5, 1960, United States’ Ballistic Missile Early
Warning System (BMEWS) went off, indicating several missile
launches from a general area in Siberia, and sent everyone in a
panic mode. A level 5 alarm meant 99.9 percent likelihood that
a missile attack had been launched. If that were true, ellipses
should have been forming on the war rooms display map of North
America in Colorado Springs and should have started to shrink,
indicating the target of the attack. Yet no ellipses were being
formed, and the minutes-to-go indicator showed nothing. Soviet
Union premier Nikita Khrushchev was in New York, attending
the General Assembly of the UN. Deputy General Slemon decided
26John McCarthy was one of the founding fathers of the field. He purportedly coined
the term ‘Artificial Intelligence’
27Nilsson, op. cit., p 407.
28Schwartz, op. cit., Michie, 1984 in.
29Ibid.
30Donald MacKenzie. Mechanizing proof: computing, risk, and trust. The MIT Press,
2004.
8
that Soviet Union was highly unlikely to attack the US while its
leader was in New York. It was characteristic human reasoning.
He also knew that the BMEWS had been operational for only four
days and was still being ’run-in.’ So, no action was eventually
taken. It was later found out that the powerful radars in Green-
land, designed to detect objects upto 3,000 miles distant, were
fooled by the reflections from the slow-rising moon over Norway.
The BMEWS intepreted the radar echoes as sightings of multiple
objects, and the engineers had left this phenomenon unaccounted
for while designing the system.”
Since expert systems are deemed to emulate the decision-making ability of
a human expert, and intelligent assistants work autonomously, human beings
are increasingly being decoupled from the inner workings and implementations
of such technology. In the case of the 1960 nuclear false alarm, human
beings had remained in the loop, and common-sense had prevailed. With the
increasing deployment of AI technology everywhere, it might not always be
the case.
In his conception of the ‘risk society’, contrasting the nineteenth-century
and the present, German sociologist Ulrich Beck31 had noted, “hazards in
those days assaulted the nose or the eyes and were thus perceptible to the
senses, while the risk of civilization today escapes perception.” This idea,
apart from its associations with nuclear technology and biotechnology, mani-
fests itself in the domain of AI, and should be read in its context as well. The
current AI technologies pose dangers of an entirely different kind - involv-
ing invisible contingencies, the seriousness of which laypersons eyes cannot
judge.32
31Ulrich Beck. Risk society: Towards a new modernity. Vol. 17. SAGE Publications
Limited, 1992, p. 21.
32The Y2K problem at the end of the previous millennium was an important indication
of the kind of risk advanced computing technologies entail. The millennium bug episode
highlights both the dependence of the modern societies upon computing, as well as the
difficulty of forming a judgment of risks posed by that dependence.
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3.3 Trust
Siri is a personal assistant application for iOS. The application uses natural
language processing to answer questions, make recommendations, and per-
form actions by delegating requests to an expanding set of web services. The
software also supposedly adapts to the user’s individual preferences over time
and personalizes results, as well as accomplishing tasks such as making dinner
reservations and reserving a cab. It is a spin-out from the SRI International
Artificial Intelligence Center, and is an offshoot of the DARPA-funded CALO
project, described as the largest artificial-intelligence project ever launched.
The project brings together experts in machine learning, natural language pro-
cessing, and knowledge representation, human-computer interaction, flexible
planning and behavioral studies. The CALO software learns by interacting
with and being advised by its users and is meant to help users with military
decision making task.
Once technical objects are stabilised, they become instruments of knowl-
edge. As already noted the current AI technologies, like expert systems or
intelligent assistants, portray an impression of intelligence which is somewhat
misleading. The actual engineering of these systems is hidden from the user,
and in most cases their knowledge and utility arises from connections to
databases and systems which are external to the environment in which they
are deployed. Thus, the knowledge these technical systems gather can be
‘exported’.33 To take a mild example - the Apple iOS assistant application
of Siri, which is a by-product of AI research, draws its knowledge from the
Cloud and Internet databases.34
How does a user trust that the AI technology is working for his (her)
welfare, and not some hidden agenda placed there, intentionally or inadver-
tently, by the programmer? How does the user trust that it will behave for his
welfare, even in his absence, if the user doesn’t have detailed knowledge of the
system’s underlying hardware and software limits, not to mention the subtle
bugs. AI systems, being highly automated and self-sufficient (and having a
deep, hidden architecture), raises trust issues which are qualitatively different
33Madeleine Akrich. “The de-scription of technical objects”. In: Shaping technol-
ogy/building society (1992), pp. 205–224.
34Krystal D’Costa. Getting Serious With Siri. 2011. url: http : / / blogs .
scientificamerican . com / anthropology - in - practice / 2011 / 11 / 08 / getting -
serious-with-siri.
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from the ‘tool-like technologies’ of the past. As more such AI technologies
make their way to the general public, the convenience of using these systems
and the deceptive nature of their intelligence will tend to replace the concerns
over privacy and security.
4 New Directions
It has been shown that extraneous sociological factors have been responsible
for the gradual deviation of AI research from its original objectives and its
acceleration in one particular direction - which has probably led to the inade-
quacies presented by AI technologies of today. Basic areas like judgement un-
der uncertainty, intuition, commonsense reasoning, inventiveness, non-linear
thinking have lagged behind, and should be encouraged. Going forward, this
paper presents the case for two complementary methodologies that help in
addressing the concerns arising out of the technologies and research as it is
today.
4.1 A Sociological View of Intelligence
Almost all of the earlier models on which AI and cognitive science rested
assumed that intelligence is not socially constituted and not socially situated.
11
In fact , the traditional AI techniques hinged on the following assumptions:35
• Human mentality is a freestanding, individual, brain based phenomenon;
and
• Human mentality is best understood in logical, linguistic, and rational
terms
Most of the current AI technologies have resulted from the research grounded
on such similar assumptions. But the success of these applications, especially
of those in the form of intelligent assistants and expert systems, depends on
the basis of how they perform in contexts and situations that are essential
social and cultural in nature. Most of the inadequacies of these technolo-
gies highlighted above, result from their inability to handle practical social
situations and uncertainties.
The idea that social and cultural factors are not only important but
primary is not yet a widely appreciated or understood possibility. In the
past, Joseph Weizenbaum has observed that intelligence manifests itself only
relative to specific social and cultural contexts.36 There is a need to develop
a sound sociological basis for Artificial Intelligence. Social and Cultural
assumptions should be incorporated in the worldviews guiding the work in
AI. Intelligence, thus, should be understood as how well an entity performs
in social situations, in addition to the inner architecture and cognitive model
that brings about that behavior. A Sociology of Artificial Intelligence will
result in more robust technologies in the future, which are better equipped
to handle real world scenarios.
4.2 Human-Augmented AI
When Doug Engelbart was creating early computer interfaces and mapping
systems, he firmly maintained his belief that the machine was meant to
be an augmenter, not prosthesis. J.C.R. Licklider,37 the computer science
pioneer who had a profound effect on the development of technology and
35Sal Restivo. Course on AI, Robots and Society: Introduction with objectives.
36William F Clocksin. “Artificial intelligence and the future”. In: Philosophical Transac-
tions of the Royal Society of London. Series A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering
Sciences 361.1809 (2003), pp. 1721–1748.
37Joseph Carl Robnett Licklider. “Man-computer symbiosis”. In: Human Factors in
Electronics, IRE Transactions on 1 (1960), pp. 4–11.
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the Internet, also had the vision of enabling man and machine to cooperate
in making decisions and controlling complex scenarios together, instead of
compromising the flexibility by being dependent on predetermined programs.
Future research should focus on similar principles.
To get a flavour of the potential power of this concept, consider the 2005
freestyle chess tournament in which man and machine could enter together
as partners, rather than adversaries. Initially, even a supercomputer was
beaten by a grandmaster with a relatively weak laptop. But the real suprise
which took everyone off-guard came at the end. The eventual winner was not
a grandmaster with a supercomputer, but actually two American amateurs
using three relatively weak laptops. Their ability to effectively use their
computers to deeply explore specific positions effectively counteracted the
superior chess knowledge of the grandmasters and the superior computational
power of other adversaries.38 This astonishing result, of average men, average
machines beating the best man, the best machine, strinkingly illustrates the
strength of human-machine cooperation - that the right symbiosis can be
much more powerful than the sum of individual parts.
The power of Man and Machine working together has also manifested
in a totally different but very relevant setting - Protein Folding. There are
more ways of folding a protein than there are atoms in the universe. This is a
world-changing problem with huge implications for our ability to understand
and treat diseases. Supercomputers have traditionally struggled in this area.
When computer scientists at created Foldit, a game where non-technical, non-
biologist amateurs visually rearrange the structure of the protein (allowing
the computer to manage the atomic forces and interactions and identify
structural issues) , it was found that the players beat supercomputers 50
percent of the time and tied 30 percent of the time. Recently, the structure of
the Mason-Pfizer monkey virus, a protease that has eluded determination for
over 10 years, was opened up to a group of online gamers (through Foldit),
who competed to model the protein, with all the associated scores, points,
and rankings of a game. The players finished the model within 10 days - a
notable and major scientific discovery39.40
Amazon partially taps into the principle of Human-Augment AI through
a concept which they call ‘Artificial Artificial Intelligence’. The premise
38Shyam Shankhar. “The rise of human-computer cooperation”. In: TED Video (2012).
39Ibid.
40Dan Woods. The Man-Machine Framework. How to Build Machine-Learning Applica-
tions the Right Way.
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is simple: Since Humans outperform AI in many simple tasks (like recog-
nizing faces or sorting patterns), so why not farm out computing tasks to
people, instead of machines? AAI has been employed as part of The Ama-
zon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), a crowdsourcing Internet marketplace that
enables computer programmers (known as Requesters) to co-ordinate the use
of human intelligence to perform tasks that computers are unable to do yet.41
Current AI technologies lack common sense and symbolic reasoning, inven-
tiveness, non-linear apparoaches, iterative hypotheses - aspects of intelligence
which come naturally and easily to humans. On the other hand, machines
have been better and ever improving in handling scale, volume and computa-
tion. Thus, an approach which harnesses the best of both worlds holds great
potential. In completely manual and completely automated system, users
and machines are effectively decoupled and too often, systems fail because
they are not designed as a whole system with people and machines working
in harmony. The power lies of Human-Augmented AI will lie in expressing
the ‘black box’ and making it transparent. The human mind will enhance
the machines solution by filling in the gaps.
A field of human intelligence - machine intelligence cooperation will
thus help answer the concerns arising from the increasing separation of hu-
man beings from the inner workings and implementations of AI technology
highlighted in the previous sections. This approach, traditionally under-
appreciated and unexplored. For example, a language of machine-plus-human
interaction has not yet been developed. There is a need to revaluate and re-
frame the conventional ‘Man vs Machine’ dichotomy towards a common ‘Man
and Machine’ framework.42 43 Research oriented at technologies which involve
both humans and machines performing intelligent tasks in the context of an
integrated system should be encouraged. This would involve designs where
both humans and machines have resposibilities, require access to resources,
and have particular knowledge appropriate to tasks. Tasks maybe performed
41Kristen Millares Bolt. Amazon creates Artificial Artificial Intelligence. 2005. url: http:
//www.seattlepi.com/business/article/Amazon-creates-artificial-artificial-
intelligence-1186698.php.
42Arnab Gupta. “Man + Machine”. In: SFSX Interactive talk (2012).
43The early signals indicating the potential of Human-Augmented AI technology can be
read in the Big Data landscape. The idea of a ‘Man and Machine framework’ to generate
commercial insights has recently been pioneered by Opera Solutions, while software com-
pany Palantir Technologies takes on important real world problems (e.g. counterterrorism)
using a concept called ‘Intelligence Augmentation’.
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in parallel, or may require results or permission from the other. The field
of Human Intelligence-Machine Intelligence cooperation would define roles
to each as tools or assistants. Different types of knowledge would have to
be distinguished: designers, end users, and maintenance people for instance.
Humans would thus be designed in the process, and friction between man
and machine, minimized.
5 Conclusions
The state of AI research and technology, as it stands today, is not without
blemishes. Under the shining surface, it hides some fairly serious concerns
and issues. Most of these risk and trust related issues arise from an imbalance
resulting from the impact of extraneous sociological factors on AI research.
The exploration of two paradigms - Sociological AI and Human-Augmented
AI - will go a long way in addressing these concerns, and hold great potential
as a research agenda for the future.
Besides this, it is essential that the funding agencies appreciate the im-
portance of long-range basic research in AI. As Nils Nillson44 observes, AI,
perhaps together with molecular genetics, will be society’s predominant sci-
entific endeavor for the rest of this century and well into the next - just
as physics and chemistry predominated during the decades before and after
1900.
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